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24 July 1975

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:

Meeting with Senators Percy and Stevenson

DATE:

23 July 1975

PLACE:

Senate Office Building

TIME:

1400 Hours

25×1A PARTICIPANTS:

NIO/China

Senator Charles Percy (R. III.)

Senator Adlai E. Stevenson (D. 111.)

DDI.

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Mr. John Lewis

1. Before the Senators arrived I told Lewis that the Senators and he should be well prepared to handle a Chinese "snow job" on such issues as "one million troops on the Soviet border", peaceful intentions in Taiwan and elsewhere. I said we knew and the Chinese knew there were less than half that number of troops on the Soviet border and that the Chinese had publicly stated on numerous occasions that the Soviets were feinting in the East and attacking in the West. I suggested also the Chinese were aware of the limited Soviet capabilities in Southeast Asia and their attacks on the Soviet Union could be really directed at Vietnam. I also suggested that the Chinese naval forces were being built up not to deal with super powers but with neighboring countries. The question was why.

2. After the Senators came I was asked about the possibilities of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement. I gave them a quick history of Sino-Soviet relations and said amelioration

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was contingent primarily on Chinese view of its national interest. I then gave them a short brief on possibilities of a Soviet "lean" in the Chinese military.

- 3. The Senators said that HAK had told them not to go into the Taiwan Problem with the Chinese. They asked me for my views. I said I was not in a position to deal with this question on a policy level. I could only examine the question from an intelligence point of view; to wit, what the Chinese were actually doing and what options were open to them. As for what they were actually doing, they were applying standard united front tactics to attain the tactical objective of eliminating American presence from Taiwan and increasing their own leverage there. Normalization of relations with U.S., contacts with Congress, State-to-State recognition with the Philippines and Thailand were all part of this process.
- 4. I then discussed Chinese military aid to North Korea and its influence on Korea. Percy asked if the Chinese would sacrifice the American connection and support North Korea should fighting break out on the peninsula between North Korea and South Korea. I said the Chinese would be placed in a real dilemma and would try to avoid the situation at all costs, but it was my personal view that if the Chinese were pushed to the wall they would probably opt for North Korea.

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- 5. Sino-Thai relations were discussed briefly and discussed at some length Chinese internal economic policies, trade and aid programs.
- 6. I also, at Senator Stevenson's suggestion, discussed the succession problem in well-understood terms emphasizing the Chinese were in a transition of leadership and the new leaders had been identified.

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National Intelligence Officer for China

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